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1.0. Introduction 
The one unquestionable task of philosophy is search for the truth. In philosophy, we struggle to 
discern ourselves and the universe, reality and existence, knowledge and beliefs, reason and 
reasoning, meaning and value of actions and objects. In all of these quests, truth is being sought, 
tirelessly too. In this activity, we strive to come in contact with reality on one hand, and on the 
other hand to present it the way it is, with minimal adulteration. Different epochs of 
philosophical thoughts can be characterised by peculiar prevalent methods of arriving at this 
curious quest. The modern period can boast of its peculiar methods such as rationalism, 
empiricism, idealism, scientism and the likes.1 These methods all cannot be right at the same 
time. Surely not!   
More pressing to the later modern philosophers2 was the claims of idealism that posits a seamless 
harmony between thought and object. For the idealist, reality consists in thought and object 
bound in a stringent coherent unity. What idealism claims as knowledge was for the more 
materialistic modern thinkers, a misrepresentation of reality, because what the idealists affirm is 
merely the content of the mind rather than the content of the world. Beginning with Bertrand 
Russell and G. E Moore, attempts were made to correct this purported erroneous pattern of 
thought, which culminated in the founding of the Analytic School. Language was the key to 
clearing the cobwebs of philosophical issues. The disingenuous character of language was the 
true cause of philosophical disputes. If language can be penetrated to reveal its content, then 
                                                           
1  Cf. Scotus Roger, The Short History of Modern Philosophy (London: Routledge Press, 1981), p. 21-23 
2 I use the term late modern philosophers to mean philosophers who lived within the 18th and 19th centuries.  
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philosophy would have one less problem. This gave birth to the discipline of philosophy of 
language. 
This essay shall explore Wittgenstein’s approach to solving the perennial problem of philosophy 
in two of his works: Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus and Philosophical Investigations. We will 
attempt a retrieval of the thoughts of Wittgenstein in his most famous work. Prior to this, we 
shall take a cursory look at the historical events that influenced of his works and finally highlight 
his contribution to the next generation of philosophers. 
2.0. Wittgenstein’s Background 
Wittgenstein Ludwig Josef Johann, the Austrian-British philosopher, was born in Vienna in 
1889, the youngest of a family of 10. A descent of a Jewish father and a Roman Catholic mother, 
Wittgenstein was educated at home until his fourteenth birthday, during this period he developed 
interest in engineering. He moved on to study mechanical engineering at the Technische 
Hochschule at Charlottenburg in Berlin for two years, and later at the University of Manchester.3 
Wittgenstein’s interest began to shift from engineering to pure mathematics and then to 
philosophical foundation of mathematics when he was had stumbled upon the book of Bertrand 
Russell- Principles of mathematics.4 In this book Russell, while grappling with the problem of 
language, tries to prove that the foundation of every language is rooted in mathematics, and so a 
quest in the understanding language required that the philosopher investigate into the principles 
of mathematics. In 1912, he enrolled in Trinity College to study philosophy under Russell, but in 
1913, Wittgenstein went into seclusion in Norway. When the First World War broke out, 
Wittgenstein enlisted as a volunteer in the Austrian Army. During these years, he committed 
himself to putting down his perplexing thought. They are what have come down to us as the 
Tractatus Logico Philisophicus. 
3.0. The Tractatus Logico Philisophicus (Early Wittgenstein) 
The Tractatus is a short, cryptic and enigmatic work of extreme originality. It is constructed 
around seven foundational propositions numbered 1-7, with all other paragraphs numbered by 
                                                           
3 Cf. Kenny Anthony, A New History of Western Philosophy, Vol. 4. (Oxford: Claredon Press, 2007),  p. 72 
4 Norman Malcolm “Wittgenstein, Ludwig Josef Johann”, Encyclopedia of Philosophy, 2nd edition. Ed.  Donald M. 
Borchert, 1967 p. 800 
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decimal expansions of each foundational proposition. The seven statements capture everything 
that he wishes to say, but since they are quite abstract, other propositions shed light on them. 
1.   The world is all that is the case. 
2.   What is the case (a fact) is the existence of atomic facts. 
3.    A logical picture of the facts is the thought. 
4   The thought is the significant proposition. 
5   A proposition is a truth-function of elementary propositions. (An elementary proposition is a 
truth function itself.) 
6   The general form of a truth-function is [p, E, N (E)]. This is the general form of a proposition. 
7   Whereof one cannot speak, thereof one must remain silence. 
From the outset, Wittgenstein clearly states what his aim is which is to “deal with the problem of 
philosophy and show...., that the reason why these problems are posed is that logic of our 
language is misunderstood.”5 Thus in addressing the central problem of philosophy as regards 
the world, thought and language, he posits that the solution to this dilemma lies in logic, and the 
nature of representation.  
For Wittgenstein, the task of philosophy is and should be directed to “the logical clarification of 
thought,” 6 which makes it an activity rather than a discipline. Thoughts are contents of the mind 
and are built upon language. Language on its part has an underlying logical structure, so that an 
understanding of the relationship between these variables show the limit of what can clearly and 
meaningfully be said.7 This was contrary to Russell’s earlier position that mathematics carries us 
beyond what is human into the realm of absolute reality where all truth can be grasped, to which 
not only the actual world, but every possible world must conform.8 Russels postulation implies 
that truth is to be built upon mathematical principles, which alone exposes or clarifies 
                                                           
5 Wittgenstein Lugwig, Tractatus Logico Philosophicus (1921). Tranl. By G. E. M. Anscombe. (West Sussex: 
Blackwell Publishing) 2009.  p. 2 
6 Cf. Ibid., 4.112 
7 Cf. Grayling A. C, Wittgenstein, A Very Short Introduction (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1996), p. 18 
8 Copleston Vol VIII p. 438 
4 
 
 
 
proposition. Although both of them agreed to the basic problem of philosophy, Wittgenstein 
proved in the Tractatus that mathematical principles can be reducible to logic in the sense that 
the number theory (Arithmetic) can be reduced to propositions containing only logical concepts 
such as variables, predicates, constants and quantifiers.9Thus mathematical logic rather than 
mathematics is the perfect language for analysing language of ordinary discourse. For it captures 
reality formally without emotions, vagueness and ambiguities. This idea was adopted by Russell 
and Frege, but Wittgenstein was to take a step further by positing that the idea that logic is the 
essential framework to all the thought goes along with the idea that there is a perfect logical 
order in the propositions of ordinary language. This position does not merely have a theoretical 
status, but the status of prescription of how a language in which thoughts are expressed must 
be.10 
3.1. Picture Theory of Meaning 
The major theme of the Tractatus is the picture theory of meaning. When we communicate what 
we perceive to be true about the way the world is, we do this in a language. So there is a 
connection between our thought, language of communication and the world. This is what the 
picture theory of meaning seeks to establish. When we experience the world, it becomes part of 
our reservoir of consciousness. When we wish then to communicate this knowledge to others, we 
conceive this idea in thought, and thought is built upon language and conversely, language is 
composed of propositions which when spoken is understood by the hearer.  
Wittgenstein claims that because every proposition carries a truth function (they can either be 
true or false11), language claims are logical. Thoughts are logical pictures of fact12 and the world 
is a totality of facts.13 Since thoughts are propositions that make sense, language consists of 
propositions which are perceptible expressions of thought and are thus a picture of reality14. 
When I hear or see a proposition expressed in a language, it is for me a perceptible expression of 
the thought of someone else. Its meaning however lies in its (the expression) ability to convey 
                                                           
9 Stroll Avrum, Twentieth Century Analytic Philosophy, (New York: Columbia University Press, 2000) p. 11 
10 Cf. Mcginn Marie, Elucidating the Tractatus  (Oxford : Clarendon Press, 2006),  p. 91 
11 Wittgenstein Lugwig, Tractatus Logico Philosophicus (1921). Tranl. By G. E. M. Anscombe. (West Sussex: 
Blackwell Publishing) 2009.  No. 4.06 
12 Ibid., 3. 
13 Ibid. 1.1 
14 Ibid. 4.01 
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the picture of reality in the speaker or writer’s mind into mine not just as words, ideas or 
concepts but as pictures. This picture is either true or false depending on whether or not it is able 
to present the facts of the reality the way they are. This is the logical relationship of language 
thought, and the world. 
Propositions are made in a language and each language is composed of words which are not 
merely jumbled-up, but must stand “in a determinate relation to one another.”15 Words that 
make propositions correspond to objects in reality,16 not by naming them, but acting as signs 
representing them.17 Propositions picture reality in the sense that their elements (words) depict or 
identify that there are objects in the world, and the arrangement of the elements make 
perspicuous description of the state of affairs of these objects.18 
Wittgenstein refers to the content of propositional sign as simple signs19 or names.20 And a name 
means an object. The object is its meaning. For instance ‘A’ is the same sign as ‘A’. Again he 
conceives of objects as absolutely simple and not merely as simple relative to some system of 
annotation.21 However, names do not seem to picture anything in reality except when they are 
combined to form a proposition which forms the picture of a state of affair.22 The challenge for 
Wittgenstein now is to define what an object is. In the Tractatus, Wittgenstein did not give an 
example of what objects are for it was quite a puzzle for him. He is recorded to have said that  
“it seems that the idea of the simple is already to be found in that of the complex and 
in the idea of analysis, and in such a way that we come to this idea quite apart from 
examples of objects, or of propositions which mention them, and we realize the 
existence of the simple objects-a priori- as a logical necessity.”23  
The aura of ambiguity which Wittgenstein hangs on the notion of object has made some 
philosophers to ascribe a flavour of metaphysics to his work. Is it the case that names do not 
represent anything concrete in the world, or that we know objects represented by names a priori?  
                                                           
15 Ibid., 3.14 
16 Ibid., 2.13 
17 Ibid., 3.221 
18 Ibid., 4.023; 2.01 
19 Ibid., 3.201 
20 Ibid., 3.202 
21 Ibid., 2.021 
22 Ibid., 4.031 
23 Wittgenstein’s Notebooks p. 60, In Norman Malcolm “Wittgenstein, Ludwig Josef Johann”, Encyclopedia of 
Philosophy, 2nd edition. Ed.  Donald M. Borchert, 1967 p. 805. 
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All pictures must have in common with reality the same logical form in order to be able to 
picture reality at all. This form is what he call “form of reality.”24 As a result, propositions of 
thought since they picture reality have the same form as the reality they picture. For instance take 
the sentence “the computer is to the left of the book.” This means quite different from another 
sentence contains exactly the same words “the book is to the left of my computer.” Hence the 
spatial relationship between words in the sentences acts as a picture to depicting the spatial 
relationship between objects in reality. Picture forms or forms of reality are rules of picturing 
that are exhibited in the meaningful propositions that correctly capture reality.25 
 Although a picture can picture reality, it cannot depict its own from of representation. We make 
assertions using propositions that act as picture, but we cannot describe how our proposition 
succeeds in representing reality.26 We can neither say how language represents the world nor 
describe the logical form of language.27 We can only identify the words in a sentence and make 
meaning out of them, i.e. infer state of affair which a sentence describes, but we cannot explain 
what the combination of words in a sentence mean in themselves. Yet if the logical structure of a 
sentence is incorrect, we can identify it, but we cannot explain why it is so, or how we were able 
to identify the flaws, because” what can be shown cannot be said.”28 
3.2. Propositions 
A combination of genuine names connected in a particular pattern make u an elementary 
proposition which is unanalyzable.29 Each elementary statement asserts the existence or 
subsistence of a state of affair. What Wittgenstein genuinely refers to as a proposition seems to 
be a co-joining of elementary statements, because he says that “it is obvious that the analysis of 
propositions must bring us to elementary propositions which consists of names in immediate 
                                                           
24 Wittgenstein Lugwig, Tractatus Logico Philosophicus (1921). Tranl. By G. E. M. Anscombe. (West Sussex: 
Blackwell Publishing) 2009.  No.2.18 
25 Cf. . Mcginn Marie, Elucidating the Tractatus  (Oxford : Clarendon Press, 2006),  p. 77 
26 Norman Malcolm “Wittgenstein, Ludwig Josef Johann”, Encyclopedia of Philosophy, 2nd edition. Ed.  Donald M. 
Borchert, 1967 p. 804 
27 Wittgenstein Lugwig, Tractatus Logico Philosophicus (1921). Tranl. By G. E. M. Anscombe. (West Sussex: 
Blackwell Publishing 2009).  No.21 
28 Ibid., 4.1212 
29 Ibid., 4.22 
7 
 
 
 
combinations”30 if an elementary proposition succeeds in describing a state of affair, it is 
considered true, it otherwise, it is false.  
3.3. The Nature of Thought and Language 
In the preface, Wittgenstein was clear about one of the objectives of the Tractatus, which is to 
“draw a limit to thought or rather not to thought but to the expression of thought.” It has been 
established that thoughts are sentences or propositions that are sensible, and sentences can only 
be in a language. Therefore, it implies that thinking is impossible without a language. Due to the 
between relationship thought and language, a limitation of language means a limitation of 
thought, and so understanding of thought (its nature, and veracity) is founded on understanding 
of language form that expresses thought.31 Wittgenstein’s interest in language and the world 
stems from the writings of Russell and Gotlobb Frege in the Theory of Description and 
Foundations of Logic. He observed that the use of language in ordinary discourse is laden with 
misinterpretation and misrepresentation of the world. Ordinary language presents to us 
adulterated state of affair. For instance: 
1. Bola is dark 
2. Laziness is a repulsive character. 
Both sentences are grammatically correct, in that we have subjects- Bola and laziness, and 
predicates that serve to describe the subjects-dark and repulsive character. It also has a copular 
joining the subject and predicate. Both of them make sense to an English user, but we cannot 
explain how this is so. However, Bola is a noun, a human being whereas ‘laziness’ is not a thing 
that can be encountered in the world, and so may not be really fit to be referred to as a subject. 
Thus there must be something about sentence (2) that is not explicit. How do we unravel the 
underlying presumptions in this sentence? From this is what prompts Wittgenstein to conclude 
that “Language disguises thought. So much so, that from the outward form of the clothing it is 
impossible to infer the form of the thought beneath it, because the outward form of the clothing is 
not designed to reveal the form of the body, but for entirely different purposes”32 Russell found 
                                                           
30 Ibid., 4.221 
31 Grayling A. C, Wittgenstein, A Very Short Introduction (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1996),  p. 19 
32 Wittgenstein Lugwig, Tractatus Logico Philosophicus (1921). Tranl. By G. E. M. Anscombe. (West Sussex: 
Blackwell Publishing) 2009.No. 4.022 
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the solution o this puzzle in logic (later Russell) and this makes up his Theory of Description. 
Using a hypothetical statement, I will try to explain how language disguises thought. 
3. The king of Imo State is smart 
But there is no current king of Imo State, so does it mean that the statement is false? Meinong 
tried to respond to this by positing that every expression with a referring or denoting function in 
a sentence does denote something, either an actually existing item or a subsisting item.33 Thus a 
proposition, for Meinong, can refer to an encounterable object or a subsistent one. So statement 
(3) is true. 
Russell did not assent to this explanation and so set out to finding the method of analysing the 
logical certainty of propositions. He came to the conclusion that every statement made in 
ordinary discourse is loaded with assumptions which are logically connected premises from 
which the statement follows. Thus statement (3) can be said to be made up of: 
4. There is a king of Imo State currently. 
5. There is only one thing in the universe who is the king of Imo State 
6. That thing is smart. 
Statements 4, 5 and 6 are the ground upon which premise 3 was made. Proposition 3 is true if 
statements 4-6 are true. On the other hand, proposition 3 is false if statements 4 or 6 are false. In 
this same vein, we can say that proposition 2 is built on many assumptions such as: 
7. There is a character called laziness 
8. There is a thing in the universe that displays the character of laziness 
9. That thing is repulsive. 
This analysis helps to dissipate the prejudice against the term ‘laziness’ as used as a subject. In 
its use, it represents or points to an actual encounterable object in reality i.e. someone who is 
lazy. Again its truth function depends on the truth or falsity of the individual premises that make 
up the chain of thought.  
                                                           
33 Grayling A. C, Wittgenstein, A Very Short Introduction (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1996),  p. 23 
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Wittgenstein develops upon Russell’s theory of description using Frege’s logic. To evaluate the 
credibility of a statement requires that each elementary statement be linked up with other 
elementary statements to form a complex proposition. This link is achieved by the use of truth 
functional connectives including “if, and, or, then, if and only if.” The content of the statement 
under analysis are reduced to logical symbols in order to exclude ambiguity. Names are 
represented by single letters such as capital X, Y and Z; elementary propositions take the form of 
‘fx’ or small case letters such as p,q, r,s. When each elementary statement is reduced, all the 
statements are now combined using the truth functional connectives.  
3.4. Structure of the World 
Since elements in a proposition describe objects in reality, Wittgenstein concludes that 
arrangement of elements that make up an elementary statement are a picture of arrangements of 
object in reality. Likewise, the logical connections between elementary statements that make-up 
a complex propositions are a picture of the logical connection between states of affair in reality. 
For he says “in a state of affair, objects fit into one another like the links of a chain.”34 Because 
the existence and subsistence of states of affair is reality35 and the sum total or reality is the 
world, therefore the limit of our thought is the limit of our world.36 This is how Wittgenstein 
describes the nature of our thought in relation to the nature of the world. 
According to the Tractatus, if a proposition is true for all the truth possibilities of the elementary 
statements, it is a tautology; if on the other hand, it is false for all the truth possibilities of the 
elementary statement, then it is a contradiction. Both contradiction and tautology say nothing 
about the world, so we do not need them except that the show the formal –logical- properties of 
language and the world.37 
The implication of this conclusion in philosophy is immense. Valid propositions which are 
product of thought say only things that are, never things that will be. Tautologous statements on 
the other hand can predict state of affairs, but do not say anything about the world. Therefore, 
there is no necessity in the world, no essentials, no right or wrong ways of looking the world of 
                                                           
34 Cf. Wittgenstein Lugwig, Tractatus Logico Philosophicus (1921). Tranl. By G. E. M. Anscombe. (West Sussex: 
Blackwell Publishing) 2009.  No. 2.03 
35 Ibid., 2.06 
36 Ibid., 5.63; 5.632 
37 Ibid., 6.12 
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acting. This position is hostile to the claims about God being the necessarily being. If this is 
flawed, then all propositions of religion and metaphysics are not to be considered.  
Whether a propositions is false or true, it still remain part of reality by virtue of the accidental 
nature of state of affair. So nothing has value in itself if everything is accidental.38In philosophy, 
the two fields that deal with value are ethics and aesthetics. For Wittgenstein,  
“it is impossible for there to be a proposition of ethics...... It is clear, however, that 
ethics has nothing to do with punishment and reward in the usual sense of the terms. 
So our question about the consequences of an action must be unimportant.--At least 
those consequences should not be events”39  
Nothing is objectively right or wrong because things are the way they are. In extension, a 
consensus method of analysing the beautiful is non-tenable because nothing is truly beautiful or 
ugly.  
3.5. Tractatus and Logical Positivism 
When Wittgenstein returned to Vienna, he was introduced to Moritz Schlick, one of the leaders 
and pioneer40 of the Vienna Circle or Logical Positivist.41 The Tractatus served the anti-
metaphysical and empiricist agenda explored by this group. Their point of departure is captured 
in these words:  
“The correct method in philosophy would really be the following: to say nothing 
except what can be said, i.e. propositions of natural science--i.e. something that has 
nothing to do with philosophy--and then, whenever someone else wanted to say 
something metaphysical, to demonstrate to him that he had failed to give a meaning 
to certain signs in his propositions. Although it would not be satisfying to the other 
person--he would not have the feeling that we were teaching him philosophy--this 
method would be the only strictly correct one.”42 
Wittgenstein’s view that all propositions are truth-functions of ‘elementary propositions’ was 
juxtaposed with Carnap’s constitution of scientific concepts from a basis of ‘elementary 
experiences’ so as to create a new, logically rigorous form of empiricism according to which all 
                                                           
38 Ibid., 6.41 
39 Ibid., 6.42; 6.422 
40 Others include Otto Neurath, Hans Hahn, Herbert Feigl, Friedrich Waismann, Olga Hahn, Victor Kraft, Philipp 
Frank, Kurt Reidemeister et al. 
41 Cf. Kenny Anthony, A New History of Western Philosophy, Vol. 4. (Oxford: Claredon Press, 2007) p. 58 
42 Wittgenstein Lugwig, Tractatus Logico Philosophicus (1921). Tranl. By G. E. M. Anscombe. (West Sussex: 
Blackwell Publishing) 2009.  No. 6.53 
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meaningful - scientific - propositions are reducible to propositions about immediately given 
experience.43 
The Logical Positivists divided all statements into three classes. First were logical statements 
which are either true or false according to their structure of the elementary components. They 
can either be tautologies when they are true and contradictory when they are false, under all and 
every condition. They are not of interest to philosophers because they do not provide any new 
information. The second class of statements are metaphysical propositions which are nonsensical 
because either they do not obey the syntax rule of sentence formation or are altogether 
meaningless. The third class are the statements of matters of fact (from David Hume). These are 
of interest to philosophers because they bother on real life situations. Enquiry into their veracity 
is a veritable tool for development since it adds new information to our store of knowledge. It is 
pertinent to know that the 19th-century French mathematician and philosopher Auguste Comte 
who named this school “Positivist” choose it because of the reality and constructive tendency of 
its doctrines. His interest was in the reorganization of the society by scientific development. 
Science with its claim of knowledge of natural forces when explored could enhance the good of 
humanity because it create crevasses in nature to enable man manipulate nature. 
They developed on Wittgenstein’s work by proposing that all knowledge claims must have their 
foundation in experience, which will be the criterion of verification or falsification of a 
proposition. If a proposition cannot be empirically verified, and it is not, or is not reducible to a 
logical proposition, it is therefore useless. This is the basis of the Verification Principle, which is 
a pungent weapon of attack on metaphysics.44 In addition, logical positivists reject the picture 
theory of meaning which is central to the Tractatus. Logic, the ideal language of philosophy was 
used to reduce statements to truth-functional elementary statements which have truth conditions. 
Ideal language was found not only to be able to articulate the ordinary sentences of natural 
languages but it also can reveal distinctions that such languages conceal. 
Logical positivists were gradually tilting towards scientism where they met with obstacles. The 
point of argument was whether experience or general laws of science was the ideal tool of 
                                                           
43 Cf. Micheal Friedsman, “Logical Positivists”, Routledge Encyclopedia of Philosophy Version 1.0, London and 
New York: Routledge (1998) 
44 Cf. Kenny Anthony, A New History of Western Philosophy, Vol. 4. (Oxford: Claredon Press, 2007). p. 59 
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verification. If we say experience, one must consider that experience is private to each 
individual. Thus what Biodun considers as truth by experience, Chukwudi may consider as 
illusion by the same experience. Again in some cases, experiences are stripped of 
communicability. 45 If on the other hand, we insist that general laws are most appropriate, we run 
the risk of the shortcoming of scientific laws, that is, of being falsified and replaced by a more 
sophisticated one not by proving the falsity of the earlier law, but by what Thomas Kuhn calls 
“paradigm shift.” There was a shift from verification theory to falsification principle. By this, a 
proposition is meaningful only if there are observations that would be relevant to its truth or 
falsity. Drawing from this postulations, all metaphysical, ethical and theological doctrines are 
meaningless, not because of any defect of logical thought, but because they are unverifiable.46  
4.0. Philosophical Investigation (Later Wittgenstein) 
After years of publishing the Tractatus, Wittgenstein continued to contemplate on the problem of 
philosophy and his earlier work. In 1953, he published another work of great quality, 
Philosophical Investigation, which looked like a denouncement of the Tractatus. However, close 
study of the work shows that it was more of a transition. What marks this transition from early to 
later Wittgenstein can be summed up as the total rejection of dogmatism or intransigent 
obedience to rules; a move from realism of logic to that of ordinary language as the centre of 
philosophical attention; from an emphasis on definition and analysis to family resemblance and 
language game; and from systematic philosophical writing to an aphoristic style- all has to do 
with the transition towards anti-dogmatism.47 It was also a refutation of Ideal Language 
philosophy developed by the Logical Positivists. The line of argument of the Investigations was 
later termed Ordinary Language Philosophy because it restored the place of natural language in 
solving philosophical problems. 
4.1. Language 
It is held in the Tractatus that any propositions presuppose the whole of language. In the 
Investigations, Wittgenstein rejects this idea by postulating that language is not something 
                                                           
45 Ibid.,  p. 59 
46 Ibid., p. 274 
47 Cf. Harry Prosch, The Genesis of Twentieth Century Philosophy. (New York: Double Day and Company, Inc., 
1966). p. 176 
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complete and autonomous48 but something that cannot be investigated independently of other 
considerations, for language is woven into all human activities and behaviour and accordingly 
our many different uses of it are given content and significance by our practical affairs, our 
occupations, and dealings with people and other components of the world.49 To imagine a 
language is to imagine a form of life.50  
In order to comprehend language and its relation to the world, we must not try to set up a 
systematic philosophical theory of language, but remove the misunderstanding that language has 
a definite structure. There is no unitary account of language and no unitary structure.51 Rather 
there are different kinds of linguistic activities, necessitating that there be different ways in 
which grammar of language works.52  Language is not one uniform thing, but a host of different 
activities. By activity, we mean its application. We use language to describe, report, inform, 
affirm, deny, speculate, give orders, ask questions, tell stories etc.53 these are but a few ways of 
applying language in daily life, and Wittgenstein calls them Language-game. In each language-
game, we have a peculiar language structure as opposed to Tractatus claim that all languages 
have a common underlying logical structure. There is also nothing common to these various 
language-games or linguistic usages. What makes all games ‘game’ is not that they have 
anything in common but that they are activities, and in this forms “a complicated network of 
similarities overlapping and criss-crossing; similarities in the large and small.” 54This 
overlapping similarity is what he calls ‘Family Resemblance.’ Thus to understand the working 
and meaning of language, one need to first recognize its variety and multiplicity instead of 
producing something common to all that we call language.  
4.2. Propositions 
The investigations flaws the denotative theory of meaning by which a word (name) points to 
some object in reality as presented in the Tractatus. Naming is not the basis of meaning, but is 
                                                           
48 Wittgenstein Lugwig, Philosophical Investigations (1953). Tranl. By G. E. M. Anscombe. (West Sussex: 
Blackwell Publishing) 2009.No. 2; 18 
49 Kenny Anthony, A New History of Western Philosophy, Vol. 4. (Oxford: Claredon Press, 2007). p.137 
50  Wittgenstein Lugwig, Philosophical Investigations (1953). Tranl. By G. E. M. Anscombe. (West Sussex: 
Blackwell Publishing) 2009.No. 19 
51 Ibid., 65 
52 Ibid., 33 
53 Ibid., 23 
54 Ibid., 66 
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part of a language-game is. Words have no meaning unless they are laid down within a language-
game and understood by participants in the game. 55 He does not seem to deny the whole idea of 
a proposition picturing the world, but maintains that expressions cannot be restricted to one 
meaning, based on a preconceived idea of structure of language, but is dependent upon the 
language-game in which it is used.  
He however denies that we always understand a proposition, even if it is a grammatically correct 
sentence whose words we understand.56Sentences have sense only in special circumstances, in 
other circumstances, we do not understand them, or we misunderstand them.57 Therefore, the 
meaning of an expression is in its use, and this use is within a language-game in which the 
expression plays a part.58 
Nevertheless, before one can find out what a name stands for, one must already have mastered 
the linguistic activities within the language game to which the word or name belong.  In a 
nutshell, in a circumstance, making an expression of thought may mean asserting something. In 
another, the same expression may mean describing a thing, or asking a question. Therefore 
language does not have a uniform structure. 
4.2. Rule, Form of Life, and Private Language 
Considering the fact that language is an activity, Wittgenstein is of the view that it makes no 
sense for one to say that he/she has mastered the rules of a language by merely knowing the 
structure of two or three sentences within a language game. The possible questions that arise as a 
result of this claim are: How do we learn rules of language?  How do we follow the rules? Are 
the rules in our minds or we know them by constant practices?59 Rules for Wittgenstein do 
indeed guide and provide standard of correctness, but they do so because they are based on 
agreement.60 To follow a rule correctly, is to conform to the established practices of the 
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community. Thus, rule following is a practice embedded in the customs of a community, a 
community who unanimously agrees to apply these rules to their language game. On this he says 
“So you are saying that human agreement decides what is true and what is false?"—It is what 
human beings say that is true and false; and they agree in the language they use. That is not 
agreement in opinions but inform of life.”61 
Is it possible for someone to have a language known to him/her alone? Can there be a so-called 
private language? Using pain (sense perception) as an analogy, Wittgenstein shows that one 
cannot privatise his sensation. You know your sensation because you know what your language 
describes it, and how people react towards it. The idea of a private language according to him a 
contradiction, because language require rules and rules implies a customary way of doing 
something.62  To speak a language is to participate in the form of life of a people,63 coming to 
share a form of life constitutes in being trained to share it; such training takes place in the public, 
otherwise it is not training in the sharing of a form of life. 64 Also, given that language is 
basically for communication, who will the one who claims to have a private language 
communicate with? As private stands in opposition to public, so does private language stand in 
opposition to public language, which makes private language nonexistent.65 
4.4. Rules of Understanding Language 
There is a natural tendency to believe that understanding language is a mental process geared 
towards its usage. That is, when we listen or read a text, there are neuronal activities. But 
Wittgenstein argues against this view by saying that “But isn’t that only because of our too slight 
acquaintance with what goes on in the brain and the nervous system? If we had a more accurate 
knowledge of these things, we would see what connections were established by the training..”66 
He thus maintains that understanding a language is not a brain processes which derive the 
meaning of an expression by evaluating it against the uniform structure of language. It is rather 
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by training and practice that we come to understand and use a language. Since language cannot 
boast of a uniform structure, the rules of language are learnt and used by practice.  
5.0. Conclusion 
The novelty of Wittgenstein’s works places him on an extraordinary pedestal. It would seem that 
his works contradicted each other, but as said earlier, the Philosophical Investigations is a 
transition, a development, or an evolution from the Tractatus. In both cases, he maintains that the 
job of the philosopher is purely descriptive and never prescriptive. This task of prescribing 
should be left to the natural sciences. He did not shift ground on the problem of philosophy 
which he identifies in both works as the problem of language, and were his major concern. The 
correct method of philosophy would be to say nothing except what can be said, and so whatever 
we cannot speak about we must pass over in silence.67 Therefore the job of the philosopher is to 
clarify propositions. It is in propositions that people claim knowledge and truth, so a deep 
understanding of language will expose the truth or falsity of thought. Wittgenstein attributed the 
rejection of natural language as a proper agent of philosophic discourse to human prejudices and 
myopic understanding the relationship between language and different worldviews, rather than 
on the deficiency of language.  
Wittgenstein’s writings influenced analytic philosophers of the 19th century. His emphasis on 
linguistics and human behaviour, practices and customs in the Investigations make him a likely 
candidate for anti-realism. Others rather advocate for a realist position that will ultimately lead to 
scepticism. In his treatment of rules, what is true or false is what human in a particular time at a 
particular place consider true or false. If observational evidences can be explained by many 
mutually inconsistent theories (accruing from a consensus), how then can we come to the 
knowledge of what the world truly is. Thus his position leads to scepticism, non-objectivity of 
truth or subjectivity based on community beliefs, and relativism. 
Conversely, Wittgenstein will not lay claim to any of these positions since he is vehemently 
opposed to theories and dogma (even though he has also setting forth a theory). Wittgenstein’s 
ideas have become unfashionable today because of its anti-theoretical, anti-scientism positions. It 
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is for the modern philosopher better left due to the problems associated with its being too 
difficult to interpret and too easy to misrepresent. 
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